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Democratisation via elections in an African 'narco state'?  
The case of Guinea-Bissau 
 
Recent development cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, focussing on good 
governance, state-building and conflict prevention, did not contribute to 
democratization nor to the stabilization of volatile political, military and 
economic structures. Both the portrayal of Guinea-Bissau as failed ‘narco 
state' as well as Western aid meant to stabilize this state by multi-party 
elections are based on doubtful concepts and assumptions. Certainly, the 
impact of drug trafficking could endanger democratization and state-building 
if continued unchecked. However, the most pressing need is not state-
building, facilitated by external aid, yet poorly rooted in the social and 
political fabric of the country, but nation-building from below as a pre-
condition for the creation of viable state institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRATIZATION AND PACIFICATION BY ELECTIONS IN 
AFRICA? 1  
 
The quest for democratic transition has been on the agenda of African countries 
since the beginning of the second wind of change in the early 1990. Multi-party 
elections have been propagated by politicians, the global donor community and 
academic scholars alike as mayor means to promote democratic change and to 
stabilize so-called 'weak' or 'failed states'. The question, whether even flawed elections 
could contribute to stabilization and democratization has been discussed 
controversially. Though there seems to be a growing consensus among politicians and 
political scientists that multi-party elections matter, regardless of the quality of their 
formal procedure2. Staffan Lindberg and others extend Rustows's (1970) theory that 
already democratic behaviour produce democratic values (cf. Lindberg 2006:vii; 2009). 
The learning-by-doing process of repeated elections is said to improve both stability 
and quality of democratic institutions in African countries steadily with practice 
(Lindberg 2006: 86; 2008). According to Lindberg, violent breakdowns of states are 
most likely before and after the first elections, although "even first elections start to 
create and affect institutions, actors, and processes of change" (Lindberg 2006:119, 
121). Contradicting hypotheses of Carothers (2002) and others which maintain that the 
focus of the international community on elections as means of peaceful democratic 
transition is misguided, have been refuted (Lindberg 2006: 119, 140).  
In my view, these theories on 'democratization by elections' – although possibly 
reflecting average trends of Africa's democratization process in the past - are based to 
much on sweeping generalizations, essentialism and exceptions to allow for 
meaningful prognoses and well founded political advice in actual country cases of 
'weak states'. The latter seems to be influenced often by the apparent lack of feasible 
alternative concepts for intervention of the donor community, by wishful thinking, and 
doubtful dogmas of behavioural science. In order to provide sound political advice 
based on realistic scholarly analyses there is no other way than to rely on a 
comprehensive study of each country's history, its formal and informal social, political 
and economic institutions and networks, which should be based of course on 
established theoretical concepts and methodology. The case study of Guinea-Bissau 
presented below serves as a first step in this direction as explorative study for the 
                                               
1
 Paper to be presented at the CIEA 7 conference '50 years of African independencies: challenges to 
modernity', Lisbon, 9-11 September 2010. Thanks for valuable comments go to Gertrud Achinger, Sabine 
Kurtenbach, Bernd Leber, Isabel Pfaff, Ulrich Schiefer, Nils Stelling, Michaela Stemplinger, Marina Padrão 
Temudo, Dario Wachholz and two anonymous referees. The responsibility for any fallacies or inaccuracies 
in the paper remains with the author.  
2
 "In spite of the nature of elections as ‘good in themselves’, they also are instruments of a global agenda 
for a post-Cold War order hinged upon certain values." (cf. Obi 2007:3). 
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generation and testing of alternative approaches. My hypotheses, to be tested in the 
following, run as follows: First, development aid meant to contribute to democratization 
and stability in African countries by promoting elections, regardless of their democratic 
quality, is misleading or even counterproductive. The same applies to underlying 
theories on the general usefulness of elections mentioned above. Second, 
conventional concepts of 'weak' or 'failed states' are heavily biased in favour of global 
Western security interests. They are equally inappropriate guidelines for political action, 
orientated at a sustainable peaceful democratic transition. Third, development 
assistance as well as any other international or national political actors who aim at 
creating stable and democratic conditions in fragile African countries should focus more 
on bottom-up policies to create and consolidate nation-building instead of trying to 
reinforce top-down formal state structures. 
 
EARLY ELECTIONS - A STEP TOWARDS STABILISATION?  
 
The political history of independent Guinea-Bissau (RGB) is characterized by an 
intimate merger of its military and political elite. The military has had a strong historical 
legitimacy in the view of the people over decades because of its decisive role in the 
liberation war. The army had in actual fact fought a people's war which greatly 
contributed to its success. The heroes of the liberation struggle like 'Nino' Vieira 
continued to be the political and military leaders after their victory over the Portuguese 
colonial powers in 1974. Yet, whereas the military led the people's struggle for national 
liberation, it gradually turned into a major factor in destabilizing the democratization 
process afterwards. Guinea’s politico-military elite became increasingly detached from 
the population, concerning both democratic legitimation and government revenue. 
Already in the late 1990s net official development aid constituted about half of the 
country's GNP (Rudebeck 2001:10-11). In addition, the search for easy money and 
reliance on external financial resources contributed to the gradual criminalization of 
state institutions and members of the power elite. First by involvement of rank and file 
of the army in weapon trafficking, notably with their neighbours in the Casamance, 
Southern Senegal (cf. ICG 2008); later-on by apparent involvement of fractions of the 
power elite in global drug cartels, as will be shown in detail further on. 
 Nevertheless, at the grass-roots, notably in the countryside, the villagers 
continued to be dedicated to democratization as they saw it: i.e. empowerment and a 
voice in the control of their own resources (cf. Klute et al 2008; Rudebeck 2001). 
Certainly, ethnicity (e.g. the question of Balante underrepresentation) played a 
significant role in the local view, notably because it was instrumentalized by the urban 
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power elite for its own interest. Yet, the vision of the struggle of liberation, carried by 
ideals of solidarity, equality and multiculturalism, was and still is so deeply engrained in 
the population that the imaginary of cultural multiplicity as a major base of nation-
building from below still prevails (Rudebeck 2001:29; Temudo 2008); again this point 
will be engrossed by more detailed analysis in the subsequent sections.  
 The states' lack of integration into the socio-cultural fabric of the nascent nation 
was most pronounced and visible in two spheres, which, however, were just two sides 
of the same coin: First, the fragile formal state structures inherited from colonial times, 
which hardly improved after independence (for details cf. Forrest 2003; Schiefer 2002; 
Klute et al. 2008). Second, an ‘uncaptured’ peasantry on the one side and the 
emergence of a stratum of poverty-ridden urban poor on the other, created last but not 
least by ill-conceived neo-liberal structural adjustment programs of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (cf. Forrest 2003; Rudebeck 2005; 2001). 
 As a consequence of the growing gap between government and the people, 
Guinea-Bissau has been ridden by political instability, a bloody civil war (1998-99) and 
numerous coups or coup attempts (the most recent in April 2010). In fact, there was no 
elected president in the country's history who served his full mandate (cf. EU EOM 
2009:3). The actual degree of this instability was highlighted in the night of first to 
second March 2009 by the assassination within hours of the army chief, general Batista 
Tagme Na Waie, and the head of state, João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira. Both, originally 
highly popular brothers in arms during the liberation war, became arch enemies later 
on. This most recent political crisis showed to which extent the Guinean state had been 
undermined and corrupted by longstanding internal feuds of the politico-military power 
elite, a process obviously stimulated by transnational networks of drug and weapon 
traffickers.  
 In order to prevent a power vacuum, the interim government – assisted by the 
international donor community – was at pains to re-establish law and order by early 
presidential elections. The prevailing view inside and outside the country was that 
Guinea-Bissau was in dire need of a functioning state3. And this not just for the good of 
the country itself. As will be shown below in more detail, the quest for stable states 
served at the same time the interest of global Western players in fighting terrorism and 
in installing stability in the entire West African sub-region, already labelled  the Pandora 
Box of Africa. This was one of the reasons why the European Union and other donors 
were prepared to finance and observe the elections, meant to legitimize the new 
government and the formal structures of democracy established with the first multi-
                                               
3
 "Stressing the importance of the upcoming presidential election in Guinea-Bissau of 28 June 2009, and 
the need to have free, fair and transparent elections as a crucial and necessary step towards the full return 
to constitutional order, consolidation of democracy and national reconciliation." (UN-SC 2009b, italics DK) 
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party elections in 1994. Even so election assistance was just one out of a variety of 
measures of the international donor community in the last decade, meant to prevent 
the outbreak of new violent conflicts and to assure a functioning state, it was all the 
same seen as essential. This view was underlined by the expertise of scholars in 
international relations who argued that free and fair elections were vital for post-conflict 
stability and development (cf. introduction and Lindberg 2009; 2006; Akopari/Azevedo 
2007). Unfortunately, there were little if any lessons learnt from the outcome of 
previous similar measures, meant to effect a significant turnaround in Guinean politics. 
One could rightly ask whether the election, as well as its subsequent legitimation by 
several international election observation missions (UN, EU, AU, ECOWAS, UEMOA, 
IOF, etc.), was rather an electoral façade without any positive impact on institution 
building, in view of the same major political and military actors still involved in the 
exercise (cf. Monteiro & Morgado 2009:2)4. Hitherto, most democratization aid for RGB 
has been of limited success: Substantial election assistance of the EU for the last 
legislative elections in Bissau in November 2008 for example had apparently little, if 
any positive impact on the functioning of the current political system. Just three month 
after the parliamentary elections, highly praised by international observers for its 
exemplary role in assisting democratization (cf. ICG 2009a:5; EU-EOM 2008), the 
underlying politico-military conflicts culminated in the extra legal killings of the top ranks 
in political and military hierarchy of the country, accompanied by the continuing 
impunity of the perpetrators5.  
 Nevertheless, the EU extended its programme of electoral assistance for the 
early presidential elections in June 2009, apparently following the motto 'business as 
usual'. On June 5, 2009, the eve of the start of the electoral campaign, further high 
ranking politicians, among them one presidential candidate, were killed, others were 
abducted or persecuted6. The attorney general received repeated death threats (the 
                                               
4
 Cf. also Issa K. Barry: 'Guinée Bissau: Pourquoi ils ont fait tomber le bonnet rouge'. L'Observateur 
Paalga, July 31, 2009 (Editorial): "Beaucoup d'observateurs de la scène politique se demandent 
légitimement à quoi servira ce passage forcé aux urnes tant qu'il n'y a pas la paix dans les cœurs. Si ce 
n'est à choisir le prochain mouton de sacrifice."  
5
 However, following the attempted coup of 1 April 2010, the EU mission for the reform of the defence and 
security sector in Guinea Bissau suspended its mission on 31 May 2010. It conditioned the resumption of 
the mission to the liberation of the army head Zamora Induta, imprisoned by the insurgents in Mansoa 
prison, and to the prosecution of the coup instigators; cf. Notícias lusófonas: 'UE condiciona apois a 
liberação de Zamora Induta e a novas chefias militares'. 21 May 2010.  
6
 Baciro Dabó, an independent presidential candidate, although PAIGC-member and Minister for Territorial 
Administration, was slain at his home in Bissau on the eve of the electoral campaign, allegedly because he 
attempted to resist a detention order (cf. here and in the following ICG 2009:6-7; EU-EOM preliminary 
report 2009:3, 7). In the same vain, Helder Proença, former defence minister, was killed, together with two 
of his body guards. Apparently he, together with Dabó, had been accused by José Zamora Induta, the 
interim army chief, to be responsible for a coup attempt. Supposedly there were misgivings in high military 
circles that Dabó, a close ally of murdered president Vieira, would take the masterminds behind the extra-
legal killings of the President and his army chief to task if he won the elections. A second presidential 
candidate, Faustino Imbalí, former Prime Minister, was beaten up and kidnapped by soldiers the same 
day. A third candidate, Pedro Infanda, leader of the Ecological Party (LIPE), withdrew already on March 
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latest in August 2009) because he tried to hunt down the culprits of the March killings; 
he dared no longer to sleep at home. Apparently unimpressed by this 'climate of 
insecurity, intimidation and fear' (EU EOM 2009:3), or because they thought they had 
no alternative, the donors, led by the UN and the EU, continued in assisting the formal 
state structures by financing and supervising the early elections on July 28, 2009. 
Probably for diplomatic reasons, international election observers shut their eyes and 
attested not only a well organized, peaceful and orderly voting process, but judged the 
elections in general as 'free, fair and transparent' and as an 'important step towards 
achieving political stability and security ' (UN-SC 2009a:2, 3, 11). They mainly deplored 
general voter fatigue and the subsequent low turnout (about 60 and 61 percent of the 
electorate in the first and second round respectively, the lowest since the introduction 
of multi-party elections in 1994)78. In the second round (26 July) the candidate of the 
ruling PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; the former 
socialist unity party) Malam Bacai Sanha, won with more than 63 percent of the votes, 
followed by his rival and former president Mohamed Kumba Yalá (candidate of the 
Partido para a Renovação Socia Social, with 37 percent; cf. EU EOM 2009; UN-SC 
2009a). Yet, the question remains whether there exist any lessons learned or 
alternatives to the conventional way of assistance for formal democratization and state-
building. 
 At least in scholarly international discussion, the general quest for 'good 
governance' and a functioning state in Africa has been a controversial issue. Whereas 
the majority of scientists, politicians and aid experts deplored the weakness of the state 
in many African countries in general and in RGB in particular, calling for the rapid 
installation of functioning state structures, others contested this view. Based on 
                                                                                                                                         
23, 2009 after having been intimidated and bashed by soldiers. Paulo Mendonca, still another presidential 
candidate, demanded in vain the adjournment of the elections in line with constitutional stipulations which 
foresee a postponement if any of the candidates dies. However, he did not succeed, the Supreme Court 
rejected his request because of overriding concerns.   
7
 ECOWAS and AU monitors reported (like the EU-EOM) "Eleições transparentes mas com visível 
cansaço dos eleitores". However, they noted "de uma maneira geral que houve um certo cansaço dos 
eleitores", tendo acrescentado "porquê votar se a escolha será a mesma?". A União Africana (UA), com 
16 observadores saudou igualmente um escrutínio "livre, transparente e equitativo".  (Noticias Lusofonas, 
28.07.09). - Similarly, national radio stations in Bissau justified the low turnout with the lack of credit of the 
'political class' and the lack of new political concepts in the view of the voters: Campanha eleitoral sem 
debate de ideias pode aumentar abstenção: "A campanha eleitoral para a segunda volta das presidenciais 
na Guiné-Bissau está a ser marcada pela ausência do debate de ideias o que pode aumentar a 
abstenção, referiram à agência Lusa vários directores de rádios guineenses. ..."Há um candidato que se 
sente confortável com a vitória, fazendo a leitura dos resultados da primeira volta, e não se dá a grandes 
esforços para tentar convencer o eleitorado com propostas", referiu. ...Para Nelo Regala, a abstenção 
representa igualmente que as "pessoas deixaram de acreditar na classe política". ..."É o cartão vermelho 
que o povo está a mostrar aos nossos dirigentes sobre os assassinatos que assistimos na Guiné-Bissau."  
<www.noticiaslusofonas.com/>; 20.07.09). 
8
 "The relative high percentage of invalid votes in the 1
st
 round (3.6 percent, DK) could be explained by the 
fact that the voting lists still included the names of the two murdered presidential candidates; votes for 
them counted as 'invalid' (cf. EU-EOM 2009 prelim report). – On general voter motivation in RGB cf. also 
Sangreman et al. 2008. 
Democratisation via elections in an African ‘narco state’? 
 
 
7 
concepts of cultural African primordialism (cf. Chabal&Daloz 2006; Bayart et al. 1999; 
Reno 1998) or of the African 'shadow state' (Ferguson 2006), followers of the latter 
position point to the fact that apparently political leaders in RGB can be replaced 
without effecting any political change, rendering Western style democratic elections 
increasingly inappropriate. In fact, according to these authors not only formal multi-
party elections, but the actual state in RGB seems to be irrelevant to the majority of its 
citizens, notably in the countryside. The state lacks its basic functions and guarantees. 
It neither assures a monopoly on violence, jurisdiction and prosecution, nor does it 
provide any other tangible benefits for the people (cf. Bordonaro 2009:36; Vigh 2009). 
According to this view, a political setting has evolved in RGB which allocates power 
politics not within or behind state institutions, but outside, in neo-patrimonial political 
alliances rooted in the country's troubled history as well as in trans-national social 
spaces, including global drug trafficking (cf. Bordonaro 2009:3; Monteiro&Morgado 
2009:2)9. 
 Unfortunately, both theoretical positions apparently cover only half of the truth, 
as will be shown in the following sections of the paper. The advocates of 'failed state' 
theories on the one hand tend to ignore both informal politics, prevailing all over West 
Africa, and the Eurocentric background of their concepts propagated as one for all 
solution, e.g. structural adjustment and formal democratization via multi-party systems 
and competitive elections. The primordialist position on the other hand (and its 
equivalent the post-structuralist imaginaire) follows uni-dimensional concepts of path 
dependency which tend to ignore the development chances provided by innovative 
cultural traits, last but not least that of cultural nationalism and the cultural base of 
nation-building. In the last resort they often end in methodological essentialism, based 
rather on stereotypes than on robust empirical evidence (cf. Meagher 2006 for a more 
detailed scathing critique of the latter position). Surprisingly enough, grass-root 
patriotism developed to a considerable extent even in Guinean villages or the 
diasporas of irregular migrants in European capitals (cf. Gable 2009:175-78) as we 
shall see further below. 
 In my view the most pressing need is not state-building, facilitated by external 
aid, yet poorly rooted in the social and political fabric of the country, but nation-building 
from below as a pre-condition for the creation of viable state institutions. Over the past 
decades a new nationalism developed in RGB and elsewhere in Africa. It shows 
remarkable differences both in its roots and its impact, compared with that of the 
                                               
9
 "…But as the experiences of Nino Vieira and Luiz Cabral [and Kumba Yala, D.K.] showed, the main risk 
to the country’s stability came from the practice of governing outside the country’s institutional 
frameworks." (ICG 2008:15).  
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national independence movements, as has been shown in detail already elsewhere (cf. 
Kohnert 2009; 2008a). Contrary to the 'first' nationalism, the 'second' is less prone to 
include, tending rather to exclude populations; alienation, xenophobia and its political 
instrumentalization are its curse. The new nationalism has been shaped decisively by 
the consequences of globalisation and by the increasing cleavage between the poor 
and the rich (cf. Barry et al. 2007 on poverty and income distribution). Nowadays, 
structures of nationalism and nation-states differ more than in the past. Frequently, the 
new nationalism is rooted in populist grass-root movements which do not necessarily 
share the same interests as the ruling class or the state. This makes for its 
extraordinary political and social ambiguity and brisance. In short, nation-building is a 
base for sustainable state-building, it is basically a question of democratic sequencing. 
However, this should not be interpreted as rigid path dependency, but rather as 
interrelated factors which can reinforce one another under favourable conditions and 
block development under adverse circumstances. In any case, neither the sequence- 
nor a gradual- or twin-tracked simultaneous approach should rely too much on formal 
conditions of democracy, most notably 'good governance' and rule of law, or on other 
formal democratic institutions as promoted by Western development aid, backed by 
scholarly expertise (cf. Branch/Cheeseman, 2009). This holds particularly for the initial 
take-off phase. Rather it should encompass and exploit the wealth of endogenous 
socio-cultural heritage as founding stone of nation-building and enduring democracy, 
as will be explained in the final section of the paper. 
 
Is Guinea-Bissau a ‘narco-state’? Drug trafficking and its impact on 
politics, economy and society  
 
In the past decade, West African governments were challenged by an upsurge 
in transnational drug trafficking from Latin America destined for European markets. The 
trafficking often follows already established routes of migration or of illegal international 
small arms trade. It is periodically adapted to changing requirements of camouflage, 
avoidance of international observation and persecution of transnational criminal trade. 
This is related, among other reasons, to a gradual shift of the cocaine market from the 
USA to Europe, notably from Colombia, via Brazil and Venezuela, to Western Africa, 
due to higher profits for trafficking with Europe (cf. Bybee 2009: 6, 11-13).10 Cocaine 
entered European markets mainly via Spain and Portugal because of its long coastline 
and its linguistic and historic ties with Latin America. At least 33 tons were seized – 
                                               
10
 This is mainly due to decreasing effective demand in the USA and the depreciation of the US$ exchange 
rate relative to the Euro. “According to U.N. figures, two pounds of uncut cocaine can now fetch as much 
as $45,000 on the streets of Europe, as opposed to less than half that price ($22,000) in the U.S.” 
(Kirschke 2008). 
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often accidentally – on the West African route to Europe between 2005 and 2007 (cf. 
Johansen 2008: 4-5; UNODC 2007a; Mazzitelli 2007: 1075, 1087; Labrousse et al. 
2008: 10-11; UNODC 2007: 9-15). Almost certainly, this was only the tip of the iceberg. 
Because of its clandestine nature the trade is difficult to quantify. UNDOC estimated 
that some 40 tons, or 27 percent of cocaine consumed in Europe annually until 2007, 
was transiting West Africa (cf. Johansen 2008: 5)11.  
 On 4 June 2010 the Gambian police, assisted by the UK's Serious Organized 
Crime Agency (SOCA), discovered a huge drug smuggling ring in Gambia. In a raid on 
a Lebanese timer factory 45 km outside the capital Banjul they seized 85 bags of pure 
cocaine, worth € 121m, equivalent to over US $ 1 bn at street value level, besides arms 
and € 210.000 in cash. This was one of the biggest ever cocaine catchs in West Africa, 
according to the deputy director of SOCA, Neil Giles12 (cf. Gharbi 2010). It had already 
suspected for a long time that Gambia had become another safe-haven for 
international drug cartels from South America and their West African counterparts, 
beside Guinea-Bissau.  
 Whereas Nigeria and Ghana were renowned centres of drug trafficking in the 
1990s, during the past five years Guinea-Bissau apparently became one of the hubs of 
cocaine trade in this region. Three outstanding seizures aroused the attention of 
international observers: In September 2006, the police arrested two Colombians in 
Bissau accused of being involved in trafficking 670 kg of cocaine, found at their home. 
Within hours after the arrest, military officers forced the police to hand over the 
                                               
11
 In 2009 it was said that cocaine trafficking through the West African region probably decreased since 
2007 by about 50 percent. This was traced back to increasing awareness of national and international 
authorities and subsequent measures of control. However, this apparent reduction was just due to 
redirected deliveries, either via neighbouring Gambia and Guinea-Conacry (cf. UN-SC 2009a:6) or towards 
new lucrative transit hubs in the middle of nowhere in the Saharan desert as most recent evidence from 
Mali indicates (cf. Boisbouvier, C. "Le Boeing de la coke." Jeune Afrique, 22 November 2009:35). In any 
case, even amounts of some 20 tons (valued at about one billion. US$ at destination) would still have a 
destabilizing impact on regional security and economy. (UNODC 2009: 17). - Just one year later, the 
representative of the UN Drugs and Crime Office in West Africa, Alexandre Schmidt, had to admit that drug 
trafficking via Guinea-Bissau had resumed again on an unprecedented scale, apparently unchecked by 
Guinean security forces (cf. Notícias lusófonas (2010): Guineé Bissau: Tráfico de drogas voltou fortemente 
ao país, dizem EUA e ONU. 5 June 2010.  
12
 Further 60 empty bags of cocaine were found in the hideway, indicating that this was a major 
redistribution centre of drugs, and that apparently only a fraction of the drugs trafficked had been 
discovered. The company, the Muktharr Trading Store, situated between Bonto village and Pirang in 
Kombo East District, Western Region of Gambia, was owned by a Lebanese born businessman Mukharr, 
a close associate of the Gambian Head of State, Jahya Jammeh; cf. Gibba, Bakary (2010): Major cocaine 
'catch' in Gambia: Lebanese timber factory transformed into a cocaine zone. Freedom Newspaper Radio, 
June 08, 2010. – In another big haul on 28 May 2010, seven foreign nationals, from Russia, Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria and Ghana, were arrested because of drug trafficking in Liberia. Drug enforcement officials seized 
four tons (out of 6 tons which were planned to be shipped via Monrovia to the USA) of Colombian cocaine 
with a street value of $100-million in Monrovia, shipped from Venezuela to Liberia for further distribution, 
mainly to the United States. The arrested member of the drug ring were accused of trying to bribe high-
level Liberian officials, including the son of President Ellen Sirleaf (who had worked as undercover agent of 
the US Drug Enforcement Agency), to protect the trafficking (cf. "US cocaine sting breaks up 100 million 
dollar Liberia plot", AFP/Breitbart@com, 1 June 2010). 
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confiscated drugs in order to transfer it to a crumbling Treasury building, were the 
consignment disappeared some days later. The accused were released on the orders 
of the Attorney General by the local judge without a legal explanation, and the case 
was filed.13 It was resumed one year later because of the alleged involvement of high 
ranking officers of the army and senior government officials in the disappearance of the 
drugs (cf. UNDOC 2007: 6). In April 2007, another consignment of 635 kg was seized 
in a vehicle accompanied by two soldiers and a civilian. But the traffickers escaped with 
the rest believed to amount to 2.5 tons which had been landed in an abandoned 
military airstrip at Cufar near Catio in the southern parts of the country. The soldiers 
were released because they were allegedly considered as hitch-hikers who were 
“simply in the wrong place at the wrong time”, as the army spokesman Colonel Asenio 
Balde declared later on (cf. Vulliamy 2008: 4). On July 12, 2008, another clandestine 
plane from Venezuela landed at Bissau international airport and was immediately 
cordoned off by military personnel. Its cargo was loaded onto vehicles and driven to an 
unknown destination. The army again blocked any judicial investigation (cf. US-HRR 
2009).  
 In short, cocaine in transit had obviously been stockpiled in Guinea-Bissau on 
an increasing scale by Colombian drug cartels since 2004, apparently with the consent 
of and in close cooperation with parts of the army and high ranking politicians. Later on 
it was shipped to Europe, either by boat or overland via Morocco, or flown in by ‘mules’, 
i.e. couriers with about 0.8 kg each hidden in their stomach or luggage. Often the latter 
applied the so-called ‘shotgun’ method in order to overcome law enforcement 
personnel at departure and destination. Thus in December 2006, the police at Shiphol 
airport, Amsterdam, detected 32 ‘mules’ in a single flight, mostly Nigerians, with 
cocaine from Guinea-Bissau (cf. Vulliamy 2008: 3). In August 2007, the Guinean air 
force announced closer surveillance and the deployment of anti-aircraft artillery to 
some of the 88 islands of the Bijagos archipelago, supposed to be a hot spot of 
cocaine transit, in view of its remote location, the lack of surveillance and reports on the 
landing of unidentified small aircraft suspected of drug transporting (cf. UNDOC 2007: 
9). However, high ranking officers of the armed forces continued to intervene in 
narcotics investigations conducted by the judicial police. In 2008, the minister of justice, 
the attorney general and the director of the judicial police received death threats in 
response to their stance against drug trafficking (cf. US-HRR 2009: 1). José Américo 
Bubo Na Tchuto, the navy chief of staff who was suspected of being involved in the 
                                               
13
 For detailed accounts of these and other outstanding cases cf. Dabo (2007); Walt (2007); Pinto/Pereira 
(2007); Vulliamy/Ferrett (2008); cf. also Vincent (2007); IRIN (2007); Vernaschi (2009). 
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trafficking, was suspended in August 2008 after an alleged coup attempt. He was kept 
under house arrest but subsequently escaped to neighbouring Gambia.  
 The 2009 political crisis following the murders of the chief of defence staff, 
General Batista Tagme Na Wai, and of the Head of State, João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira, 
a few hours later, on March 1, 2009, was mainly due to increasing factionalism in the 
military. Yet, it was probably also linked to the surge of organised drug trafficking, in 
which apparently the former navy chief Na Tchuto, living in self-imposed exile in 
Gambia in view of accusations of his involvement in a coup attempt, had been 
involved, too (cf. ICG 2009: 1, 3-4). Hardly a year later, drug cartels based in Gambia 
and Guinea-Bissau were once more suspected of involvement in another abortive coup 
in Bissau on 1 April 2010. Among the supposed instigators of the coup attempt was 
again former Guinean navy chief Na Tchuto. He had clandestinely returned from his 
exil in Banjul to Bissau in December 2009, taking refuge at the local UN mission. End 
of May, Na Tchuto, who had resumed apparently his position as a key figure in the 
Guinean army, was acquitted of the charge of an attempted coup in 2008 by a military 
tribunal (cf. RFI, 1 June 2010). 
The ‘narco-state’: facts and fiction of a biased concept 
Under these conditions, Guinea-Bissau had seemingly become the African 
country the most completely immersed in the drug trade (cf. Ellis 2009: 191). For some 
scholars and politicians it has even become the textbook example of the first African 
‘narco-state’14 (cf. Kirschke, 2008: 1; Bybee 2009; Johansen 2008: 4). State failure has 
been identified as the key problem of the country. The grossly insufficient 
administrative and political structures which impede the effective control of the territory 
and the combat of drug trafficking endangered not only the peace consolidation 
process in Guinea-Bissau. For the US-government, other global players, the UN and 
concerned international NGOs, this posed a potential new global security threat, last 
but not least because drug money is said to be closely linked to small arms proliferation 
and to financing international terrorism.15 Organised crime, drug trafficking and 
terrorism are seen as the “new Achilles’ heel of West Africa” (cf. Andrés 2008). Hence, 
on June 25, 2008, the UN Security Council urged the government in Bissau to stop the 
                                               
14
 A ‘narco-state’ has been defined as “’an area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted 
by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent’, it is hard to deny that Guinea-Bissau 
is Africa’s first ‘Narco-State’.” (cf. Bybee 2009: 18). A detailed description of the structures of a ‘narco 
state’ is given by West (2006: 10-11), taking the example of Tajikistan. 
15
 According to the renowned Brooking Index of State Weakness, RGB belongs to the most vulnerable 
countries worldwide, liable to pose serious transnational security threats. In fact, the country ranks in the 
lowest 20 percent of the so-called ‘critical weak states’ (rank 18 out of 141 developing countries, placed 
between Burma and Ethiopia, (cf. Rice/Patrick 2008: 16-17)). The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy 
initiative ranked RGB as 27
th
 out of 37 states indexed as ‘failed states’ with an acute security alert in 2009 
(cf. Fund for Peace 2009). 
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trafficking and to “strengthen its international and regional cooperation to fight the 
narcotics trade and organised crime plaguing the country” (Panapress, 7 July 2008). 
For the International Crisis Group (ICG, Brussels), one of the leading Think Tanks on 
conflict analysis and prevention, state failure is the core weakness at the root of the 
recurrent political crises and the proliferation of criminal networks in Guinea-Bissau. 
The ICG sees a real risk for the country becoming a ‘narco-state’, attractive to drug 
barons as well as terrorist networks in the Maghreb.16 According to its analysis, no 
political leader has really tried to establish the necessary structures for a functioning 
democratic state since independence in 1974. Yet, the ICG experts hold that only the 
implementation of effective state institutions and the regulation of political competition, 
no longer entrenched in the guerrilla mentality generated by the struggle for liberation, 
but built upon a functioning multiparty system, could end the current political crisis and 
provide a basis for sustainable development in Guinea-Bissau. Consequently, ICG 
strongly advised the international donor community to urgently support efforts to 
consolidate democracy, reform the security sector and construct viable state structures 
(cf. ICG 2008: 1, 24; ICG 2009). 
 However, international endeavours to assist RGB’s democratization process, 
guided by the ‘failed’ or ‘narco-state’ concept, are likely to fail as well. An increasingly 
critical scholarly review of the concept revealed that it is heavily biased in several 
aspects (cf. Call 2008; Hameiri 2007; Bøås/Jennings 2007; Groves 2008; 
Hagmann/Hoehne 2009). First, its political use is often inherently based on the global 
player’s perception of security. Notably those states (like Afghanistan, Sudan and 
Somalia) have been labelled as ‘failed’ where the breakdown of formal institutions was 
perceived as a threat to Western security interests.17 Others with similar deficiencies 
(like Angola and Ivory Coast) were even assisted and hedged, as far as they continued 
to provide an enabling environment for international capital or hegemonic foreign 
policies.18 Second, the focus of the ‘failed state’ concept on state capacity, notably on 
order and security, as represented by the assumed five ‘core institutions’ of the state 
(military, police, civil service, justice and government), without due regard to other 
equally important political factors, such as equality, empowerment or human rights, 
disregards important possible tensions and trade-offs in promoting state-building (cf. 
                                               
16
 According to Antonio Mazzitelli, the West African representative of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 
trafficking is only part of the menace. “Certainly the major threat that drug trafficking or all other 
transnational organized crime introduces into the West African scenario at large is the possibility of 
hijacking and influencing the democratic process. […] Thanks to the enormous financial and corruptive 
power of this money, this is a major concern in a country like Guinea-Bissau.” (Latham 2009; cf. Mazzitelli 
2007: 1087). 
17
 Since 2002, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was a remarkable shift in the US National 
Security Strategy which concludes: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing 
ones.” (quoted by Call 2008: 1491).  
18
 For detailed examples cf. Bøås/Jennings (2007). 
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Call 2008: 1496-1497). If state reconstruction is analysed in technocratic terms, 
concentrating on a single fit-for-all remedy (namely ‘order’) for quite different illnesses, 
it is likely to ignore the political economy and social nature of state- and nation-building, 
as reflected in the different nature of regimes (cf. Hameiri 2007: 122; Call 2008: 1497-
1498).  
 Alternative, methodological approaches of statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa 
centre around concepts of the ‘shadow state’ (Ellis 2009: 195), of ‘para-statal 
institutions’ (cf. Trotha 2000), and the (re-)emergence of non-state political orders 
(Klute et al. 2008:.17-19); all inseparably interwoven with more or less stable forms of 
the ‘modern’ state. Yet, only the latter corresponds to the generalized notion of 
statehood, still prevailing in Western concepts of ‘failed states’. The alternative 
concepts mentioned above refer to the particular history of state-building in Africa. 
Notably the age-old dualism between customary and colonial rule, reinforced by the 
practice of indirect rule and its repercussions to be felt up to now, particularly in 
Anglophone Africa: this implies also trans-national informal power networks and 
institutions of governance on all levels, from the district council to the state house in the 
capital. Most often these deeply rooted, but clouded political structures are hidden from 
Western politicians’ view, and accidentally from that of many scholars, too. 
Nevertheless, they are by no means a relict of the past, restricted to remote rural 
areas, but very much alive, continually transforming and inventing itself anew.19 
 
INCREASED AID - THE MOST PROMISING WAY TO TURN AROUND FAILED 
(NARCO) STATES?  
 
Even the introduction of multiparty democracy along with relatively strong core 
state institutions would not guarantee peace and sustainable development in RGB. 
Similar to the failure of the socialist development path, applauded and heavily assisted 
without avail by so-called progressive donors in the 1980s (cf. Schiefer 2002; Kohnert 
1988), democratization is also likely to fail if primordial informal politics are allowed to 
prevail unchecked. This has been shown even in the model case of Benin Republic, 
the highly praised ‘lighthouse’ of democratic renewal in Africa, that showed the futility of 
formal democratization if pursued within the deeply rooted and revered socio-cultural 
framework of patronage and rent-seeking (cf. Bierschenk 2009). Under these 
conditions, additional development assistance (ODA) in countries that are already 
                                               
19
 Cf. Klute et al. 2008; Chabal/Daloz 2006, and their critical review by Meagher 2006; Sassen 2000; and 
Schiefer 2002. 
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highly aid-dependent as RGB20 (also called ‘aid orphans’) could be easily transformed 
into a 'sovereign rent'21 for the politico-administrative and military elite. In fact, Guinea’s 
power elite increasingly relied on sovereign rents from aid and illicit trade, e.g. fishery, 
drugs, weapons, in the past decades (cf. Schiefer 2002). Thus, in the worst case 
scenario, well-meant but ill-applied aid could exert (and probably did wield already) 
similar devastating effects on the democratization process like sovereign resource 
rents (including illicit rents from criminal networks and drug trafficking) by making 
patronage politics financially feasible and thus derailing the democratization process 
(cf. Collier 2006: 1484).  
 Paul Collier and others, however, maintain that aid does not constitute a 
sovereign rent and therefore is not likely to have effects akin to resource rents. 
Therefore, they consider international technical assistance, closely supervised within 
the framework of political conditioning, as the most promising way to fund ‘turnarounds’ 
and to address the problem of ‘failing states’ (cf. Collier 2006: 1492-1496). Yet, there is 
no robust proof that aid could not act in a way comparable to resource rents. All 
depends on the aims and methods of implementation of aid, meant to increase the 
empowerment of the people. Even ex ante governance conditionality of aid utterly 
failed because it did not sufficiently consider the informal structures of the ‘shadow 
state’. This applies also, but not uniquely, to the case of RGB where aid has been 
misused over decades as a sovereign rent, not controlled by any political system of 
checks and balances on the part of Guinean citizens (cf. Djankov et al. 2008; Schiefer 
2002; Kohnert 1988). Although international donors’ rhetoric of aid conditionality 
stressed time and again the need to curb aid for poor performers like RGB, the 
provision of ODA continued on a substantial scale. The donor community was 
increasingly concerned about the opportunity cost of non-intervention (cf. Einarsdóttir 
2007: 107-108). And this not just with respect to felt needs and interest of the local 
population, but also in view of Western global security and regional stability concerns 
(cf. above). Aid strategies based on these interests, focussed on rather technocratic 
aspects of formal institution building, do not necessarily have the desired impact on 
empowerment or democratization from below which is the ne plus ultra of sustainable 
development in Africa (cf. Crawford 2009). 
 
 
 
                                               
20
 About 80 percent of Bissau’s state budget is derived from ODA (cf. Einarsdóttir 2007: 105). The country 
is second only to the Comoros on the list of most dependent countries worldwide, receiving on average 
(1970-1999) the equivalent of almost 14 percent of GDP as aid (cf. Djankov et al. 2008: 173).  
21
 For a definition cf. Collier 2006. 1484.  
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Nation-building as a pre-condition of state-building? 
Therefore, the international call for the building of a (strong) state in RGB (cf. 
ICG 2008) misses the point in the actual situation: As said above, the most pressing 
need is not state-building without regard to its firm anchorage in society and economy, 
but nation-building from below as base of duly legitimized sustainable democratic state 
institutions. The regime created and sustained by Nino Vieira was detached from the 
majority of the population and based on 'narrow power networks' faithful to the ruler (cf. 
Forrest 2002: 261; Temudo 2008: 248). Yet, it should be underlined again: there exists 
no unilateral path dependency or sequencing. Africa’s new nationalism22 has been 
shaped decisively by the consequences of globalization (last but not least by 
transnational networks of drug and weapon trafficking) and by the increasing cleavages 
between the poor and the rich (cf. Dorman et al. 2007). 
 Nation-building is the formation of a political community and its struggle for 
freedom, justice and democracy with the ultimate end of conquering the commanding 
heights of state power as the political sovereign. Therefore, nation-building often 
precedes state-building. By the way, it is doubtful whether development or nation-
building have ever been on the agenda of African states in the first place (cf. Chipkin 
2007:35). Whereas nation-building was certainly a major point on the agenda of 
Amilcar Cabral and Guinea’s liberation movement in the early 1970s, it was surely not 
one of the priorities of the subsequent heads of states in Bissau. Nevertheless, quite 
independently from official politics, new national identities, including a common Creole 
language and a truly national Guinean culture, developed from below in RGB (cf. 
Mourao 2009: 95-100; Augel 2007; Rudebeck 2001; Augel/Cardoso 1996). The 
Guinean people still share a basic feeling of national identity, reinforced by the armed 
struggle against colonial domination, and based on a common and unifying tradition, 
including shared language, culture, custom and religion, in short the basic cultural 
infrastructure of belonging to a nation (cf. Chipkin 2007:200-205; Rudebeck 2001).  
 However, the political history of citizenship is closely and increasingly linked 
with accelerated mobility and migration enforced by globalisation. This provides also 
the base for counteracting 'politics of belonging', instrumentalized by particular political 
elites to their own advantage. There are several examples from other African countries, 
as shown by the recurrent outbursts of xenophobia in South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and 
elsewhere. Bissau is certainly not spared from this risk, as the rancour against bi-
national Capverdians after independence, or more recent cleavages between Gambian 
and Senegalese petty traders and their Guinean counterparts demonstrated. States 
                                               
22
 Cf. Kohnert 2008a; 2009 for a definition of the concept of 'new nationalism' and its repercussions for the 
analysis of current development in Africa and elsewhere. 
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may even entirely collapse without disappearing as nations from the social imaginary, 
as Crawford Young rightly observed in his theoretical contribution to a reader edited by 
Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent (2007:241).  
 
CONCLUSIONS: GUINEA-BISSAU IN NEED OF NATION-BUILDING FROM 
BELOW AS BASE OF THE RECONCILIATION OF THE WARRING FACTIONS OF 
THE URBAN POWER ELITE 
 
A reorientation of aid and transnational norm-building networks aiming at 
empowerment of the people could have considerable impact on nation building and 
reconciliation of warring factions of the political and military elite in Bissau. However, 
increased technical assistance of the international donor community does not 
necessarily foster the required turnaround. To be sustainable, aid needs to be not just 
massive, rapid and effective. It requires a reorientation of overall aims of development 
assistance in RGB. Global concerns about stability and security should be outbalanced 
against the pressing need of nation-building by bottom-up democratization and 
integration of cherished informal political and economic institutions into an essentially 
revised state structure. A piecemeal but painstaking democratization of the fabric of 
informal politics, including chieftaincy and a meaningful decentralization policy from 
below (cf. Crawford 2009; Klute et al 2008), would be required to lay a sustainable 
base for a functioning democracy at the grass-root level, which could eventually lead to 
a more responsive government. In short, there is nothing which could replace political 
struggle for real democracy from below. 
 As Lars Rudebeck (2001) aptly summarised in his study on democracy's 
sustainability in RGB, more complex power structures need to be addressed, far 
beyond the multi-party system and conventional election procedures. In this respect a 
Sovereign National Conference, following the Benin model (cf. Adamon 1995; Banégas 
1995; Heilbrunn 1993), could serve as ignition point of a true democratization process 
concerning its substantial and innovative social and political impetus to 
empowerment.23 However, this would hold only if the political class and civil society 
institutions in Bissau take all necessary precautions to avoid the salient negative 
aftermath of the betrayal of the results of the Sovereign National Conferences in Lomé 
by the ruling class in the 1990s (cf. Nwajiaku 1994). Due consideration should be paid 
                                               
23
 A Sovereign National Conference as a basis for meaningful democratization and stabilization should not 
be confused with the pledges to install a “national conference” by established political leaders, issued for 
example by the acting president Malam Bacai Sanhá of the Partido Africano para a Independência da 
Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in the election campaign of the presidential elections of 2009 (cf. resolutions 
and demands of the Conferência Nacional de Diálogo, Bissau, 25 to 26 May 2009 (Lusa, 26.05.09; 
‘Declaração de Bissau’). The latter runs the risk of rather serving to consolidate established political 
structures, as demonstrated by similar events in the history of independent RGB. 
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also to the lessons learned from a similar but less sustainable Guinean exercise of a 
National Conference after the civil war in 1999. In this respect, the most recent 
endeavour of the Guinean Parliament, backed by the UN, the National Institute of 
Studies and Research (INEP, Bissau) and the Portuguese branch of the international 
NGO Interpeace (Aliança Internacional para a Consolidação da Paz) to create civic 
peace initiatives (Voz di Paz, created in 2007)24, and to convey a National Conference 
of Reconciliation, could be a step in the right direction. On its agenda are the 
identification of the causes of conflicts in RGB, the contradictions between state and 
civic institutions, and conflict prevention strategies. Besides representatives from 
various government departments, civic and religious organisations, veterans, women, 
youth and the media are meant to participate, too (cf. UN-SC 2009a: 2, 11). However, 
the National Conference as outlined above, apparently will not be sovereign, and 
therefore risks to end as futile as innumerable other eloquent but aloof top down 
measures for democratic transition or reconciliation in the history of independent 
Guinea-Bissau. 
Yet, a successful take-off would require not just 'good governance' in the sense 
of international donors concerns, but also the incorporation of democratic discourse 
and institutions at the local level. In order to be sustainable, this must be accompanied 
by substantial economic improvements in the livelihood of ordinary citizens25. 
Democratization alone will not satisfy the basic needs of the people; as there is no 
guarantee that it will lead automatically to pro-poor economic growth (cf. Robinson 
1994:610).26 Altogether, the proposed new focus of aid and national politics would 
probably be more efficient to install enduring peace, security and democratization than 
the pursuit of multiparty democracy and formal institution-building by foreign aid, 
without due regard to the underlying informal political setting and its vested hidden 
interests. This is not to say that economic post-conflict recovery strategies would be 
useless. Yet, they make sense only as complementary measures, and they should 
differ from standard approaches of economic development and poverty reduction in 
that they give a premium to reintegration of ex-combatants, job creation for young men, 
and deep cuts in military spending (cf. Collier 2009). 
                                               
24
 For details cf. website: www.interpeace.org/index.php/Guinea-Bissau/Impact/Results.html; 02.12.09 
25
 The cost of rice, a basic staple food in RGB, increased on average by 20 to 30 percent over the past 
year (cf. UNSC-2009a.8), although the government has tried in vain since decades to provide affordable 
supply of basic food for the poorer sections of the population. 
26
 For recent examples of studies on the linkage of democratization and economic development with an 
focus on Africa cf. Rodrik / Wacziarg 2005; Nel 2005; Ndulu et al 2008. Yet, robust quantitative evidence 
on the linkage is lacking. In view of the predominance of informal political and economic institutions in 
West Africa, hypotheses or theoretical substantiation on this linkage, based on chronically imperfect 
quantitative data on economic growth in Africa, are challenged out of methodological reasons (cf. Kohnert 
2008 for more details).  
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